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Recent empirical evidence strongly points to the state dependence of fiscal multipliers that are larger in
recessions than in expansions. Yet standard business cycle models face great difficulty in producing such
asymmetric fiscal policy effects. By incorporating endogenously binding collateral constraints into a
medium scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, we find that fiscal effectiveness can vary
substantially across the business cycle. The key to our framework is the state-dependent nature of
collateral constraints—binding in bad times while slack in good times, amplifying the effectiveness of fiscal
policy and hence generating fiscal multipliers that are larger during recessions.
INTRODUCTION
Substantial fiscal stimulus packages adopted in response to the 2008–9 global financial
crisis revived interest in the effectiveness of fiscal policy, particularly in downturns. A key
finding from the ensuing empirical work has been that fiscal multipliers are state-
dependent—larger in recessions when there is spare capacity in the economy, and smaller
in upturns. For example, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2013), Baum and Koester
(2011), and Fazzari et al. (2015) find that government spending multipliers range from
near zero at the peak of the business cycle to 1.6 or greater during recessions. Similarly,
Tagkalakis (2008) shows that fiscal policy has been more effective in expanding private
investment during recessions compared to expansions in OECD countries. Bachmann
and Sims (2012) document the non-linearity in government spending multipliers, and
show that this is due to governments pursuing different types of policy in upturns versus
in downturns. Although other papers find smaller variation (see, for example, Owyang
et al. 2013; Ramey and Zubairy 2018), there is now significant empirical support for
fiscal multipliers that vary across the cycle.
Despite such widespread evidence, formal work on the state dependence of fiscal
effectiveness lags behind. That is perhaps not surprising given the difficulty that standard
business cycle models face in generating asymmetries in dynamics. To the best of our
knowledge, there are only two attempts in the existing literature to formally answer the
question of why fiscal policy is more effective in bad times. In the first, Michaillat (2014)
demonstrates that the effect of fiscal expansion varies across the stages of the business
cycle by utilizing a simple New Keynesian framework with search and matching
employment frictions. An increase in public employment increases the tightness of the
labour market and crowds out private employment; this effect is stronger in expansions
(when employment is already high and the labour market tight) than in recessions,
leading to the public employment multiplier doubling (from 0.24 to 0.49) when the
unemployment rate rises from 5% to 8%.
The second formal explanation for the asymmetric effects of fiscal policy is provided
by Canzoneri et al. (2016), who base their state-dependent multipliers on costly financial
intermediation. By incorporating countercyclical variation in bank intermediation costs
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into the model of Curdia and Woodford (2010), Canzoneri et al. (2016) arrive at fiscal
multipliers that are state-dependent. In the presence of financial frictions that are
aggravated in recessions, an expansionary fiscal action facilitates more borrowing by
reducing the interest rate spread, which is itself countercyclical.1 This, in turn, allows
fiscal policy to be more effective in expanding output in bad times than in good times.
While Canzoneri et al. (2016) get a significant state dependence in the short run (the
impact multiplier during expansions is approximately 1, as opposed to 2 during
recessions), the difference disappears in the medium horizon.
In this paper, we propose an alternative explanation for the asymmetric effects of
fiscal policy by developing a tractable model based on endogenously binding borrowing
constraints. Building on Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2017), we incorporate collateral
constraints that are tied to the value of housing wealth into a medium-scale dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. In this framework, a share of households
face borrowing constraints that are binding in normal times and recessions, but become
‘slack’ during expansions when their consumption is high. As a result, during recessions
any additional income from fiscal expansion and associated loosening of their borrowing
constraint is spent on consumption; however, during expansions the borrowing
constraint is slack, and the marginal utility of consumption is lower, and additional
income is smoothed across time, which results in lower output increases. Therefore fiscal
policies that raise household income when the marginal propensity to consume is higher
(when the borrowing constraint is binding) will have a larger impact than when this is not
the case.
While the fact that models with credit-constrained consumers produce higher fiscal
multipliers is well-understood, these agents are permanently constrained in much of the
existing work, at odds with state-dependency of responses to fiscal policy (see, for
example, Galı et al. 2007). A key advantage of our framework is the endogenous nature
of the slackness in the credit constraint in our model, which allows us to establish the
state dependence of multipliers. In order to examine the potential asymmetries in fiscal
policy, we construct a medium-scale New Keynesian DSGE model with eight fiscal
instruments. Our model economy is populated by two types of households: patient
(lenders) and impatient (borrowers). Both households supply labour to firms and the
government, consume the final good and accumulate housing; however, impatient
households discount the future at a higher rate and, as a result, borrow from patient
households that also lend to the government and accumulate physical capital. Central to
our framework is the explicit treatment of housing wealth, which has a key role in
determining the value of the collateral constraints for impatient agents, and therefore the
implications of the fiscal shocks. The model features nominal rigidities in price and wage
setting and real frictions of adjustment costs, monopolistic competition in the non-
residential good sector, capital utilization costs, and external habits in consumption.
We find that fiscal policy is indeed state-dependent, and fiscal effectiveness varies
substantially across the cycle. Moreover, the rich fiscal structure that we employ in our
framework allows us to calculate the state dependence of fiscal policy for a large number
of fiscal instruments. For example, we find four-quarter cumulative spending multipliers
to be, on average, 49% lower during consumption booms compared to when the
borrowing constraint is always binding; tax multipliers are on average 33% lower in
booms. We find clear heterogeneity across fiscal instruments; multipliers in targeted
transfers vary the most between booms relative to normal and recessionary times, as
these policies strongly impact on the consumption dynamics of impatient households.
Our consideration of such an extensive set of fiscal instruments allows us to generalize
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our results and identify new outcomes such as in the case of capital taxes, where
expansionary policy (a cut in taxes) leads to a substitution from labour to capital, and
subsequently lower incomes for credit-constrained agents. Under this scenario, having
more access to borrowing in the boom allows these households to mitigate the impact of
the policy, increasing their consumption in addition to the expansionary effects from the
policy of increasing the productive capacity of the economy. Our results further suggest
that it is the credit conditions of agents that determine the asymmetry of fiscal
multipliers, and not the fiscal action itself, as the size and direction of the latter play a
limited role in the former. That is, only shocks to transfers and labour taxes can have a
substantial effect on the access to credit for impatient agents, and therefore, for the
majority of policies, the size and expansionary/contractionary nature of the fiscal action
does not lead to asymmetries itself. The implication of this is that the impact of fiscal
policy is determined by the underlying economic environment much more than by the
size and the direction of fiscal action.
Moreover, the asymmetries in the effectiveness of fiscal policy persist in the long run,
in contrast to the results of Canzoneri et al. (2016), who find the non-linearity of their
state-dependent multipliers diminishing beyond ten quarters; this persistence better
matches the empirical results that typically look at multipliers over the medium term (for
example, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) measure output multipliers over five
years). Furthermore, our modelling assumptions mean that higher fiscal multipliers are
present in both normal times as well as downturns, making them the rule rather than the
exception; this is consistent with the empirical estimates from Tagkalakis (2008) and
Fazzari et al. (2015).
To provide evidence for the mechanism of occasionally binding collateral constraints,
we estimate the model using the simulated method of moments to demonstrate that such
constraints better match the skew in macroeconomic data; a model without occasionally
borrowing constraints cannot replicate this skew. Further, we empirically estimate
multipliers from exogenous tax changes identified in Romer and Romer (2010) using the
smooth transitioning VAR (STVAR) process of Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013);
our estimates suggest that multipliers are lower in booms in the housing market, in credit
and in the general economy, providing further evidence for the central mechanism
proposed in this paper.
An additional advantage of our framework with its rich set of policy instruments is
that we can explore the state dependence of fiscal multipliers in nine separate cases: five
government spending policies (government consumption, government investment,
transfers, targeted transfers and public employment) and four tax instruments
(employers’ social security contributions and labour, consumption and capital taxes).
Given that the existing two theoretical studies employ one type of fiscal multiplier each—
public employment in Michaillat (2014) and government consumption in Canzoneri
et al. (2016)—it is important to establish whether the state dependence of fiscal
multipliers is limited to certain instruments or applies generally. Doing this also allows us
to map our results to the estimated fiscal multipliers, which vary substantially across
different types of public spending (see, for example, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
2013). More importantly, our findings on the state-dependency of individual fiscal
multipliers enable us to present policy prescriptions for disaggregated fiscal policy, with
crucial implications for policy design, particularly in downturns.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I presents a detailed description
of our model economy and the policy-making structure. Section II provides a number of
fiscal experiments towards uncovering the state-dependent nature of fiscal policy
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effectiveness. Further extensions and robustness checks are presented in Section III.
Section IV assesses the empirical relevance of our framework with occasionally binding
constraints by using the simulated method of moments of the model and STVAR
estimates, and discusses our results within the context of the existing empirical literature.
Section V concludes.
I. THE MODEL
Our model builds upon that of Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2017) in two clear ways: first, we
endogenize the production of the residential (durable) good; and second, we develop a
full fiscal sector with eight policy instruments and nine policy experiments.2 In what
follows, we present the key features of the model structure; the rest of the model
description is presented in an Online Appendix.
Households
As in Iacoviello and Neri (2010), there is a continuum of measure 1 of households in each
of the two groups: ‘patient’ and ‘impatient’. Both types of household consume residential
and non-residential goods, and supply labour to production. The key difference between
the two types of household is that the patient discount the future at a lower rate than the
impatient, and hence the former are lenders to the latter; the value of housing stock of the
impatient agents acts as collateral against their borrowing, as in Iacoviello (2005).






c ln CPt ðiÞ  hPCPt1ðiÞ




where superscript P is used for patient agents, i indicates a particular household, and t
represents time; b is a subjective discount factor; rl is the inverse elasticity of labour (L);
rh denotes a weight on housing in utility; eBt and e
H
t denote shocks to intertemporal
preferences and housing preferences as in Iacoviello and Neri (2010); CP and HP
represent consumption of the final good and housing, respectively; hP denotes the
external habit parameter, CP* denotes average consumption of patient households, and
CPc is a scaling factor as in Iacoviello and Neri (2010).3 Each patient household receives
income from the following sources: their after-tax labour income ð1 sltÞ wPt ðiÞLPt ðiÞð Þ,
where slt and w
P
t denote the labour tax and wage rate; the after-tax capital income
ð1 skt Þ rn;k;tun;tðiÞ Kn;t1ðiÞ
 
, where skt denotes the capital tax rate, and Kn, un and rn,k
(n 2 {c,h}) denote the physical stock of capital, the utilization and rental rate of capital
used in the production of the consumption (n=c) and the housing good (n=h); the after-
tax dividend income ð1 skt ÞdivtðiÞ; interest income from holdings of government bonds
(B) and loans to the impatient agents (LO),
ðRt1  1=ptÞBt1ðiÞ þ LOt1ðiÞ, where
Rt1 is the gross nominal interest rate on one-period bonds and pt=Pt/Pt1 is gross
inflation; and lump sum transfers from the government lTRt, where l is the share of
government transfers received by patient households.
Each patient household i spends: ð1þ sct ÞCPt ðiÞ on the final consumption good, where
sct denotes the consumption tax rate; ∑n=c,hIn,t(i)=Ic,t(i)+Ih,t(i) on investment in physical
capital in the consumption and the housing producing sectors, respectively;
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qt

HPt ðiÞ  ð1 dhÞHPt1ðiÞ

on residential property, where qt=Ph,t/Pt denotes the relative
price of housing and dh the depreciation of housing; LOt(i)(LOt1(i)/pt) and Bt(i)
(Bt1(i)/pt) on loans to impatient households and purchases of government bonds; and
on costs arising from changes in the level of the capital utilization rate in both the
consumption and housing sectors, aðun;tÞ Kn;t1ðiÞ.4
Investment increases the stock of physical capital according to





where eIt , as in Smets and Wouters (2007), denotes a shock to the price of investment
relative to consumption goods.




In;tðiÞ þ ð1þ sct ÞCPt ðiÞ þ qt HPt ðiÞ  ð1 dhÞHPt1ðiÞ
 þ LOtðiÞ þ BtðiÞ
¼ ð1 sltÞ wPt ðiÞLPt ðiÞ




þ ð1 skt Þ
X
n¼c;h







where APt denotes state contingent securities, the presence of which implies that
households are homogeneous with respect to consumption and assets choices;
households are assumed to supply differentiated labour, and as such, without these
securities would otherwise receive different income and have different expenditure
allocations.5 Each patient household maximizes utility subject to the budget constraint,
the capital accumulation equations and the demand for labour. Wages are set subject to
Calvo (1983) frictions.






c ln CItðiÞ  hICIt1ðiÞ
 þ eHt rh ln HItðiÞ  11þ rl LItðiÞ
 1þrl :ð4Þ





transfers (1l) TRt, and the net acquisition of new loans
LOt(i)(LOt1(i)/pt) should match total expenditure made up of: interest payments on
outstanding loans
ðRt  1Þ=ptLOt1ðiÞ; the expenditure on consumption ð1þ sct ÞCItðiÞ;
and the net acquisition of housing qt

HItðiÞ  ð1 dhÞHIt1ðiÞ

. The impatient agents’
budget constraint is therefore given by
ðRt1  1ÞLOt1ðiÞ
pt
þ ð1þ sct ÞCItðiÞ þ qt





þ ð1 sltÞwItðiÞLItðiÞ þ ð1 lÞTRt þ AItðiÞ:
ð5Þ
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The maximum that an impatient agent can borrow is defined by the constraint
LOtðiÞ ð1 sÞqtHItðiÞ;ð6Þ
where s denotes the ratio of the down payment to the value of housing. This constraint
states that the value of the loan must be less than or equal to the value of housing,
adjusted by the down payment ð1 sÞqtHItðiÞ. Each impatient household maximizes
utility subject to the budget constraint, the borrowing constraint and the demand for
labour.
Non-residential good sector
Final good sector The final good Y is produced by combining differentiated







where υp ≥ 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution among the differentiated outputs of
intermediate firms, and Yt(j) denotes the output of the jth producer. The retail firm
chooses Yt(j) and maximizes profit of the form




where Pt is the price of the composite good, and Pt(j) denotes the price of the
intermediate firm j. The first-order condition results in the demand equation for the
output of intermediate producer j, Ytð jÞ ¼

Pt=Ptð jÞ
tpYt, and the zero profit condition







Intermediate good sector The production technology of the monopolistically
competitive intermediate good producers is given by the Cobb–Douglas function
Ytð jÞ ¼ eA;ct Kac;t1ð jÞ NPc;tð jÞ
 b1 NIc;tð jÞ 1b1h i1aKrgg;t1  U;ð8Þ
where eA;ct denotes a productivity shock; Kc,t1( j) and Kg,t1 denote public and private
capital services, respectively; NPc;tð jÞ and NIc;tð jÞ denote labour supplied by the patient
and impatient households, respectively; a denotes the share of capital in production; b1
represents the share of patient households in total labour used in production; Φ is a fixed
cost; and rg denotes the elasticity of output with respect to public capital. Monopolistic
producers choose Kc,t1( j), NPc;tð jÞ and NIc;tð jÞ to minimize total real costs of production
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subject to the available technology, where all prices of inputs are taken as given.
Monopolistic producers are also price setters, and prices are subject to Calvo (1983)
frictions. In particular, in each period a share of firms hp are unable to re-optimize their
price and change prices by the central bank’s target rate of inflation.
Residential good sector
The competitive residential good producers use capital Kh and labour of patient and
impatient households, NPh and N
I
h, to produce residential output HI using a Cobb–
Douglas production function of the form
HIt ¼ eA;ht Kahh;t1 NPh;t
 b1 NIh;t 1b1h i1ahKrgg;t1;ð9Þ
where eA;ht denotes a housing-sector-specific productivity shock, and ah is the capital
share in the production of housing. Producers of both the non-residential and residential
goods are subject to employers’ social security contributions (ser), which adds a tax
proportional to the total labour costs of the firm. Note that public capital Kg,t enters the
production function of both the intermediate goods producer (equation (8)) and the
residential good producer (equation (9)) in the same way; in this respect, government
capital is a public good as it is non-excludable and non-rivalrous.
Monetary policy
We adopt a standard formulation of monetary policy where policymakers follow a
Taylor rule through which the nominal interest rate responds to movements in both
output and inflation with some persistence q:
Rt ¼ max 1;R
Rt1
R











where eRt is a monetary shock; GDP represents gross domestic product, which is given by
GDPt ¼ Yt þ qHIt þ ð1þ sert ÞðwPt NPg;t þ wItNIg;tÞ;
where NPg;t ¼ #gNPt and NIg;t ¼ #gNIt represent public employment of patient and
impatient agents, respectively; p is the central bank’s target rate of inflation and
pAt ¼ Pt=Pt4 is the annual inflation rate; qp and qy denote, respectively, the
policymaker’s aversion to deviations of inflation and output from their respective steady-
state values.6 Variables with no time subscript represent steady-state values. As in
Iacoviello and Neri (2010) equation (10) maintains that the nominal interest rate does not
respond directly to variation in house prices.
Fiscal policy
The government budget constraint requires that spending on consumption (Gc),
investment (Ig), transfers (TR) and public employment (N
P
g and NIg), as well as the
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repayment of previous period debt, is equal to tax receipts from the four revenue sources





Bt1 þ Gt þ Ig;t þ TRt
¼ sct CPt þ CIt
 þ slt wPt LPt þ wItLIt þ sert wPt NPt þ wItNIt 
þ skt rk;c;tuc;t Kc;t1 þ rk;h;tuh;t Kh;t1 þ divt
 þ Bt;
ð11Þ
where Gt ¼ Gc;t þ ð1þ sert Þ wPt NPg;t þ wItNIg;t
 
. For transfers, we adopt two scenarios: one
where transfers are spread evenly across patient and impatient households (l = b1,
where b1 is the share of patient households in total labour used in production); and
another where transfers are targeted to impatient agents who both have lower incomes
and who respond more to changes in transfers (l = 0).8 In total, therefore, there are eight
fiscal instruments and nine fiscal experiments at the disposal of the government
(including both targeted and general transfers).
Public investment augments public capital according to
Kg;t ¼ ð1 dk;gÞKg;t1 þ Ig;t;ð12Þ
where dk,g denotes the depreciation of public capital. Consistent with Ratto et al. (2009),
Leeper et al. (2010b) and Traum and Yang (2015), we assume no adjustment costs or
utilization rates for government capital; we test the sensitivity of our results to this in the
first subsection of Section III. Fiscal policy rules are set similar to those used by Leeper
et al. (2010a). We assume that fiscal policy responds countercyclically to the movements








t ¼ 1þ gx;t þ gx;t1 þ gx;t2 þ gx;t3;ð13Þ
where x ¼ fsc; sk; sl; ser;Gc; Ig;NPg ;NIg;TRg is the set of fiscal instruments, and where
gx;t Nð0; r2xÞ are i.i.d. normally distributed errors. Shocks to fiscal instruments therefore
last for only four quarters, with no persistence (as is adopted in Coenen et al. 2012);
robustness to different specifications of these shocks is conducted in Appendix A.
Equilibrium in residential and non-residential markets
The homogeneous output of the residential good producer is purchased by patient and
impatient households:
HIt ¼ HPt þHIt  ð1 dhÞ HPt1 þHIt1
 
:ð14Þ
The final goods market is in equilibrium when the aggregate supply equals the aggregate
public and private demand in the final consumption good, investment and housing. The
resource constraint is given by
Economica
© 2020 The Authors. Economica published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of London School of Economics and
Political Science




 b1 NIc;t ð1b1Þh i1aKrgg;t1  U










where s1,t is a term denoting price dispersion.
II. ARE THE EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY STATE-DEPENDENT?
Time preference, borrowing constraints and consumption
To explore the asymmetries in the model, a full understanding of the consumption
decisions of impatient households is crucial given that it is through the impatient agents
that the non-linear effects of policy are transmitted. The first-order conditions for
impatient and patient households with respect to consumption are presented in the Euler
equations
















where kb is the price of borrowing (the ratio of Lagrange multipliers on the borrowing
constraint and the budget constraint), and








denotes the marginal utility of consumption for m 2 {P,I}.








Put differently, when the constraint on borrowing is binding (when the first expression of
inequality (19) is greater than the second), impatient agents would rather borrow more
than they are permitted. This, in turn, is when the marginal utility of additional
consumption (UIc;t=ðPtð1þ sct ÞÞ) is greater than the expected cost of this borrowing
(cRtEtU
I
c;tþ1=ðPtþ1ð1þ sctþ1ÞÞ) to the impatient agent. In this situation, any additional
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income in the current period (including any extra borrowings from the loosening of the
borrowing constraint) is used for contemporaneous consumption. This suggests that
when impatient consumption in the current period is sufficiently high, the constraint on
their borrowing is no longer binding (kbt ¼ 0) and the two Euler equations of the patient
and impatient households become similar. Intuitively, this is when the marginal utility of
additional consumption from extra borrowing is equal to the expected cost of this
borrowing. Put differently, when kbt ¼ 0, impatient agents smooth any additional increase
in income over the period in which they expect the borrowing constraint to be slack. In
doing so, they reduce interest payments and this allows for a slightly higher consumption
profile in the longer horizon.9























which confirms the intuition from above. When kbt ¼ 0, the two equations become
similar, where the difference in discount rates means that the impatient bring more
consumption forward than the patient. In this situation, impatient households smooth
any additional income over the horizon in which the borrowing constraint is slack
(kbt ¼ 0), and their borrowing is lower than the constraint permits. The presence of kbt in
equation (17) implies that any loosening of the borrowing constraint results in higher
consumption today, whereas a tightening of the constraint has the reverse effect.10
Policy experiments
Provided that the constraint on borrowing for impatient agents is always binding (kb>0),
these agents borrow all that is permitted and there are no asymmetries in the dynamics
from the model; that is, the impact of shocks in the model is symmetric. Therefore in
order to identify non-linear effects of fiscal policy, this borrowing constraint needs to not
bind for some time interval; this will happen when consumption today is so high that the
marginal utility gained from further borrowing (and therefore further consumption) is
equal to the marginal cost of borrowing, as stipulated by inequality (19). In this
environment, shocks of the same magnitude will have different effects depending on how
long the borrowing constraint on impatient households does not bind, or is ‘slack’. In
order to get the constraint to not bind, as in Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2017) we use a
housing preference shock (ɛH in equations (1) and (4)) such that the stock and value of
housing increases for impatient and patient agents, therefore increasing the borrowing
potential of impatient households and thus consumption; we then increase the size of this
shock in order to increase the number of periods in which the constraint does not bind.11
To calculate the size of fiscal multipliers, we include a small fiscal shock on top of the
housing preference shock such that the length of the period in which the borrowing
constraint does not bind is not altered; this fiscal shock is spread equally over four
quarters before it subsequently dies (as specified in equations (13)). We then calculate
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multipliers by looking at the difference in variables with the additional fiscal shock
compared to the counterfactual of including only the housing preference shock in the
economy. In this respect, we find what Erceg and Linde (2014) call a ‘marginal’ multiplier
as the fiscal intervention is not of sufficient size to change the state of the economy. In the
first subsection of Section III, we discuss results from extensions to these fiscal
experiments, including where we allow for sizeable fiscal shocks such that policy can alter
the time horizon over which the borrowing constraint on impatient households is not
binding. The benchmark results from using the experiments as outlined above are
consistent with these further extensions. Finally, note that the period when the borrowing
constraint on impatient agents binds can be considered as the multiplier corresponding to
both ‘normal’ and recessionary times, while when it does not bind the economy is
experiencing good times or a ‘boom’; the longer the constraint does not bind, the longer
the boom.
In order to quantify the impact of policy on output, we employ the following metric






where T is the time horizon over which the multiplier is measured, x is the respective
fiscal instrument, and variables with a subscript zero are outcomes corresponding to the
counterfactual of no fiscal change. When x is a government spending instrument, we use
the monetary value of the change in spending as the denominator. (Throughout the
paper, we use the expression ‘government spending’ to represent the four spending
instruments in the model in total.) To ensure consistency, for tax multipliers we use the
change in tax revenues were all other variables (with the exception of the relevant tax
rate) to remain the same.12 In solving the model, we apply the toolkit for solving dynamic
models with occasionally binding constraints developed in Guerrieri and Iacoviello
(2015).
Calibration
We calibrate the model using values adopted in the previous literature and data from the
USA between 1985 and 2016, as outlined in Table 1. We set the ratio of government
consumption, investment, transfers to output and the share of public employment to
total employment to match the averages in the data for the period 1985–2016 (we take
1985 as the starting point to be consistent with Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2017)).13 The
calibration is in line with Trabandt and Uhlig (2011), Drautzburg and Uhlig (2015) and
Alpanda and Zubairy (2016), who calibrate government consumption to GDP to 18%,
15.3% and 18%, respectively, and again Drautzburg and Uhlig (2015), who calibrate
government investment to GDP to 4%.14 In setting the tax rates, we rely on the dataset
and methods used in Trabandt and Uhlig (2011). For the purposes of this paper, we
modify their work in two dimensions: first, we recalculate the tax rates so that our
starting point is 1985 (their average tax rates are calculated for the period from 1995);
and second, we include both labour income taxes and employers’ social security
contributions (whereas Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) combine both in one tax rate).15
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For the majority of the remaining parameters, we follow the calibration in Guerrieri
and Iacoviello (2017), as outlined in Table 1. The exception to this is that our capital
utilization cost and investment adjustment cost are based on the estimated values in
Iacoviello and Neri (2010). The elasticity of fiscal instruments to debt (/b;x) is set to 0.2,
which means that all instruments are used to ensure government solvency and respond
TABLE 1
CALIBRATION
Parameter Description Value Data/Source
Preferences
rh Utility share of housing 0.093 *
rl Inverse Frisch elasticity of labour 1 GI
hP Patient habit persistence 0.40 IN
hI Impatient habit persistence 0.61 IN
b Patient discount factor 0.995 GI
c Impatient discount factor 0.9922 GI
b1 Share of patient agents 0.5013 GI
s Down payment ratio 0.1 GI
qB Persistence in housing shock 0.9835 GI
Technology
ac Share of capital in non-residential production 0.3 IN
ah Share of capital in residential production 0.1 IN
dk,c Depreciation of non-residential capital 0.0145 *
dk,h Depreciation of residential capital 0.03 *
dh Depreciation of housing 0.0101 *
dk,g Depreciation of public capital 0.0151 *
rg Elasticity of output w.r.t. public capital 0.02 LWY
/k Investment adjustment cost parameters 14.25 IN
j Capital utilization adjustment parameter 2.2258 IN
hp Price stickiness 0.9182 GI
hw Wage stickiness 0.9163 GI
tp Steady-state price markup 0.2 GI
υw Steady-state wage markup 0.2 GI
Monetary policy
q Monetary policy persistence 0.5509 GI
qp Inflation Taylor rule weight 1.7196 GI
qy Output Taylor rule weight 0.0944 GI
p Quarterly inflation target 1.005 GI
Fiscal policy
/b;x Response of fiscal instruments to debt 0.2
sc Consumption tax rate 0.05 TU
sl Labour tax rate 0.2 TU
sk Capital tax rate 0.36 TU
ser Employers’ social security contributions rate 0.07 TU
G/GDP Public consumption and employment to GDP 0.149 0.149
IG/GDP Public investment to GDP 0.041 0.041
TR/GDP Transfers to GDP 0.114 0.114
#g ¼ NIg=NI ¼ NPg =NP Share of public employment 0.147 0.147
Other ratios matched
(CP+CI)/GDP Consumption to GDP 0.645 0.645
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slowly to bring debt to its steady state; debt as a result of fiscal shocks is halved after 34
quarters, and sensitivity to this parameter is tested in Appendix A. We set the elasticity of
output with respect to public capital equal to 0.02, which is in line with the range of
estimates discussed in Leeper et al. (2010b). We set the depreciation rate of public capital
to 0.015 to match the ratio of public capital to GDP in the data. The estimates of habit
persistence in non-residential consumption for the patient and impatient agents are taken
from Iacoviello and Neri (2010) for the period 1989–2006; they also estimate habit
persistence in housing to be indiscernible from zero. We calibrate the weight of housing
in the utility function and the depreciation of housing to match the ratio of housing
wealth to GDP and of residential investment to GDP; this implies a utility weight of
0.093 and a depreciation rate of 0.0101, values very close to the ones used in Iacoviello
and Neri (2010). Since Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2017) do not use housing production, we
use the share of physical capital in production from Iacoviello and Neri (2010). Given the
shares of capital in production, the capital income tax rate and the patient households’
discount rate, we set the depreciation of both residential and non-residential capital to
match the investment and capital to GDP ratios in the data. The depreciation rate of
non-residential capital is set at 0.0145, similar to rates used in Drautzburg and Uhlig
(2015) and Alpanda and Zubairy (2016), and the depreciation rate of residential capital
(0.03) is in line with Iacoviello and Neri (2010).
To assess the reliability of our calibration, we compare four-quarter output
multipliers from our benchmark model specification (where borrowing constraints are
always binding) to those presented in Coenen et al. (2012).16 In general, our multipliers
fit within the range of estimates from the different models utilized in Coenen et al. (2012).
The one exception is for consumption taxes, where we get higher multipliers; this is
driven by the fact that our benchmark calibration for habit formation in consumption
(for which we used the estimated results from Iacoviello and Neri (2010)) is lower. As can
be seen in the final subsection of Section III, calibrating higher levels of habit persistence
in consumption brings our consumption tax multipliers in line with those presented in
Coenen et al. (2012) and has a limited effect on the key findings in our analysis.
Dynamics
In order to explore the transmission mechanism through which fiscal policy impacts on
impatient agents’ consumption (and subsequently the broader economy), we present
TABLE 1
CONTINUED
Parameter Description Value Data/Source
(Ih+Ic)/GDP Non-residential investment to GDP 0.123 0.123
q HI/GDP Residential investment to GDP 0.042 0.042
(Kc+Kh)/(49GDP) Business capital to GDP 2.107 2.239
q(HI+HP)/(49GDP) Housing value to GDP 1.038 1.033
Kg/(49GDP) Public capital to GDP 0.679 0.678
Kh/(Kc+Kh) Share of residential capital in total capital 0.009 0.007
Notes
The abbreviations ‘GI’, ‘IN’, ‘LWY’ and ‘TU’ refer to Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2017), Iacoviello and Neri
(2010) Leeper et al. (2010b), and Trabandt and Uhlig (2011), respectively.
* represents a value implied by other calibrations to fix steady-state shares to empirical values.
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dynamics from two fiscal experiments involving a shock to transfers (Figure 1) and
government consumption (Figure 2). In these plots, the period over which the borrowing
constraint on impatient agents is slack varies between zero and 18 quarters.17 As
discussed in the second subsection of this section, we get this borrowing constraint to not
bind by shocking housing preferences (ɛH) and then consider the impact of policy by
including a further shock to the relevant fiscal instrument.
An increase in transfers increases both the income for impatient households and the
level of government debt. In normal times, when kb>0, impatient households convert
increased incomes into increased consumption for the four quarters while the shock is
active (this includes additional borrowing arising from an increase in the value of the
borrowing constraint). This is because the marginal utility of additional consumption for
these households is higher than the marginal cost of borrowing, as discussed in the first
subsection of this section. Higher demand from impatient agents brings about higher
output, and inflationary pressures lead to an increase in the real interest rate, which
subsequently leads to a fall in consumption of patient households, as indicated in
equation (21).
When the borrowing constraint on impatient agents is not binding, on the other
hand, these agents smooth any additional income over the period in which they expect
their borrowing constraint to be slack, where changes in consumption are also driven by
habit persistence (thus explaining the hump in impatient consumption over this
smoothing period). This is when the marginal utility of additional consumption for these
households is equal to the marginal cost of this consumption, which implies a smaller
increase in impatient households’ consumption in the short run, and therefore a smaller



























































































































FIGURE 1. Dynamics from a transfer shock.
Notes: Dynamics from fiscal experiments where the borrowing constraint on impatient agents is slack for 0, 6,
12 and 18 quarters, as illustrated by the legend. In each instance, the results have been normalized to present
the dynamics as a result of a shock to fiscal policy equal to 1% of output; dynamics for each variable are
presented as percentage deviations from the steady state. The results present marginal impacts as the length
of time for which the borrowing constraint is not binding is unaffected by the policy; the normalization is
performed on shocks equal to 0.01 of this and is done for ease of presentation. [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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increase in output. This can be seen in the first and second panels of Figure 1 (for output
and impatient agents’ consumption, respectively) for differing periods over which the
borrowing constraint is slack; a smoothing of impatient income leads to a smoothing of
the effects of policy on output.
The smoothing actions of impatient households impact on the dynamics of patient
agents in two ways. First, when the impatient borrowing constraint is not binding for a
period of time, their smoothing of consumption leads to more persistent levels of
inflation and subsequently higher real interest rates following the fiscal shock. Second, a
smoothing of consumption by impatient agents leads to a smaller response to output
arising from the fiscal action, and as such lower tax revenue and higher debt. The
combination of anticipated higher interest rates and taxes (the latter needed to repay
higher debt) leads patient agents to reduce expenditure more when impatient agents
smooth their response to the policy, as is clear from equation (21). Therefore the response
of output to fiscal stimulus in the short run is determined by the actions of impatient
agents, which are influenced by whether they are constrained in their borrowing; over the
medium term, however, the dynamics of output are determined by the actions of patient
agents responding to the wealth outcomes of the policy.
Figure 2 presents dynamics arising from a government spending shock, for differing
horizons over which the constraint on impatient borrowing is not binding; as is
illustrated in the first panel, output multipliers tend to be lower than 1, suggesting a net
crowding out of private expenditure to the policy. Similar to above, an increase in
government consumption leads to increases in both impatient incomes and government
debt. Higher output and inflation result in an increase in the real interest rate, which
crowds out expenditure of patient households on impact, as indicated in equation (21). In
normal and recessionary times, when kb>0, impatient agents increase their consumption
in the short run when government consumption is increased, as extra aggregate demand
increases labour demand and subsequently income for these agents. When the borrowing
constraint on the impatient is not binding, on the other hand, these agents smooth the


























































































































FIGURE 2. Dynamics from a government consumption shock.
Notes: See Figure 1. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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additional expenditure over the period in which they expect the borrowing constraint to
be slack. Therefore the mechanism determining the consumption path of impatient
households is the same as in the case of transfers. The main difference between the two
policy experiments, however, is the fact that transfers impact directly the income of
impatient households, whereas government consumption’s impact is indirect through
higher labour income. Therefore the increase in income and consumption is smaller in the
case of government consumption (as shown in Figure 2), and the output effects of this
policy come from public (and not private) demand. As the income being smoothed is
smaller, the impact on the real economy resulting from this smoothing process is also
smaller, and therefore the difference in response of output between expansions and
recessions is not as large as in the case of transfers. Given this, the subsequent influence
of consumption smoothing of impatient agents on patient households’ expenditure via
the channels discussed above (expected real interest rates and taxes) is also smaller, as can
be seen in Figure 2.
Fiscal multipliers
To extend the analysis to all nine fiscal experiments, the first column of Figure 3 presents
four-quarter cumulative output multipliers (vertical axis) for differing periods for which
the constraint on impatient households’ borrowing does not bind (horizontal axis); note
that the plots present step functions as dynamics will be altered with only discrete
changes in the time horizon over which this borrowing constraint is not binding. The
intuition from above—that the longer the slack in the borrowing constraint, the smaller
the fiscal policy effect on output—is maintained.18 As discussed above, in periods of
slack, impatient agents are already consuming enough to not use their full credit
capacity, and increases in their incomes during these periods lead to a lower consumption
response of impatient agents compared to when their borrowing constraint binds. For
example, average government spending multipliers are 49% lower when there is slack in
the impatient borrowing constraint for 20 quarters compared to when this is always
binding; similarly, taxation multipliers are lower by (on average) 33% between the two
benchmarks. The largest non-linearities in multipliers are for targeted and general
transfers and labour taxes, which are 0.61, 0.28 and 0.29, respectively, in normal and
recessionary times when the borrowing constraint binds, and approximately zero when
there is slack for 20 quarters.
The one exception to the main result is for capital taxes that have a higher impact on
the economy when the impatient borrowing constraint is not binding. In normal and
recessionary times (kb>0), a cut in capital taxes leads to a substitution from labour to
capital, lowering labour income and therefore impatient consumption. In this situation,
impatient households would prefer to borrow more (kb increases), which they can do if
the borrowing constraint is not binding. Therefore a decrease in capital taxes has a
smaller negative effect on the consumption of impatient households during expansion,
and as a result, there is an additional improvement in output resulting in a higher
multiplier. The distortionary nature of taxes can lead to the general intuition to break,
but only in our model for taxes on capital; for all other instruments, expansionary policy
leads to higher incomes for impatient agents and as such, if their borrowing constraint is
not binding at the time of the policy, then output multipliers are lower.
The degree to which the effects of fiscal policy are non-linear is determined by the
degree to which the effectiveness of policy is influenced by the consumption movements
of impatient agents. If these movements are small when the borrowing constraint binds
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(for example, when the government increases spending on consumption, investment and
employment, or when it decreases employers’ social security contributions or taxes on
capital), then the non-linearity of the response to fiscal policy is smaller. Cumulative
four-quarter consumption multipliers presented in the second and third columns of
Figure 3 demonstrate that impatient consumption multipliers are largest when their
borrowing constraint is binding for targeted and general government transfers, and
labour and consumption taxes. As such, these instruments lead to the most non-linear of
outcomes in both impatient consumption and output; note that the consumption of
patient agents is largely unaffected by the actions of the impatient in the four-quarter
horizon. Patient agents have higher discount factors, and their consumption is influenced
by the path of expected future real interest rates and consumption taxes (as demonstrated
in equation (21)); although the actions of the impatient influence these, the effects come
over the medium term, and as a result, four-quarter consumption multipliers are not as
volatile as for impatient households.
To examine further the role of binding versus non-binding borrowing constraints on
fiscal outcomes, Figure 4 presents a decomposition of four-quarter cumulative output
multipliers for each of the nine fiscal experiments, separated between government
spending and tax instruments. The movement of each component of GDP is examined to
determine what is contributing to the movement in total output over the first four
quarters of the fiscal intervention; for each fiscal experiment, two results are presented
side-by-side, one where the borrowing constraint on impatient agents is always binding
(left-hand bar), and another where it is slack for 20 quarters (right-hand bar). These
results illustrate that the movements in impatient agents’ consumption are the biggest













































































































FIGURE 3. Four-quarter cumulative multipliers.
Notes: Cumulative multipliers for the nine fiscal experiments for differing horizons over which the borrowing
constraint on impatient households does not bind; the first column presents output multipliers, the second
column presents impatient non-residential consumption multipliers, and the final column presents patient
non-residential consumption multipliers. The first row presents results for government spending instruments,
and the second row presents taxation instruments. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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source of non-linearity in these multipliers; the bars that represent impatient spending are
those that vary the most between the different scenarios. It follows, therefore, that when
impatient spending is not a large contributor to the output multiplier, the difference in
results relative to when the borrowing constraint is not binding is smaller; that is, for
those policies that do not require movements in impatient households’ consumption to
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FIGURE 4. Decomposing four-quarter cumulative output multipliers.
Notes: A decomposition of output multipliers for each instrument (along the horizontal axis) where each
instrument has two bars, representing a pair of values: in the left-hand bar, the borrowing constraint on
impatient agents is always binding; in the right-hand bar, it is slack for 20 quarters. The decompositions
separate between the elements that contribute negatively and positively to the four-quarter cumulative output
multiplier, with the circle-point in each bar representing the value of the multiplier (the net of the positive and
negative effects). [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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As highlighted in Figures 1 and 2, although the smoothing actions of impatient
agents reduce the output response of policy in the short term, when their borrowing
constraint is slack, over a longer period it improves output as consumption is spread over
the longer horizon. This smoothing of actions by the impatient agents leads to less non-
linearity in multipliers when measured over a long horizon; this is confirmed in the first
column of Figure 5, which plots 20-quarter cumulative output multipliers. Non-linearity
is still observed, and although the percentage changes in output multipliers are similar,
the absolute range of these values is smaller. Targeted and general transfers continue to
be the most non-linear spending instruments, and 20-quarter cumulative multipliers are
negative for general transfers when there is slack in the impatient borrowing constraint.
These negative multipliers result from the rise in distortionary taxes to pay for the
expansionary policy, and from the behaviour of patient households, as discussed in the
previous subsection.
Over short time horizons, the non-linear response of fiscal multipliers is determined
by the consumption of impatient agents; however, evaluating a period that nests the
entire time in which borrowing constraints are slack (and therefore the period over which
impatient consumption is smoothed), it is the response of patient agents that becomes
more important. This can be seen in the second and third columns of Figure 5, which
presents 20-quarter cumulative consumption multipliers for the two types of household
for differing periods over which credit constraints are slack. Whereas in Figure 3 the non-
linearity in four-quarter cumulative consumption multipliers is driven by impatient
agents, when the whole period over which these agents can smooth their consumption is
considered (as in Figure 5), the non-linearity is driven by patient households.
As discussed above, the difference in the four-quarter output multipliers between
expansions and recessions stems from the consumption smoothing of impatient
households during expansions. Over the 20-quarter period, the entire smoothing exercise
is completed, therefore there is limited volatility in the impatient households’











































































































FIGURE 5. Twenty-quarter cumulative multipliers.
Notes: See Figure 3. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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consumption multiplier. On the other hand, the smoothing process of impatient
households results in more persistent real interest rates and larger increases in the present
discounted value of taxes, which leads to greater crowding out of patients’ consumption
and therefore a lower consumption multiplier for these households. There is therefore
both a short-run and a long-run non-linearity to fiscal policy. In this respect, our results
differ from those presented in Canzoneri et al. (2016), which uses costly financial
intermediation to produce asymmetric fiscal multipliers; in their paper, although the
short-run multipliers are different in recessions and expansions, there is limited non-
linearity over a longer time horizon (beyond ten quarters).
III. FURTHER EXTENSIONS
Further fiscal experiments
As discussed in the second subsection of Section II, the fiscal experiments in our
benchmark specification featured small temporary shocks spread over four quarters. To
examine the non-linear effects of policy further, we now consider larger shocks that can
generate substantial changes in macroeconomic outcomes. In this respect, these shocks
can influence the time horizon over which the borrowing constraint on impatient
households is not binding, and therefore we now present average multipliers compared
with the ‘marginal’ effects analysed above.
We apply housing preference shocks of different values to change the underlying
conditions of the economy; column (1) of Table 2 presents the percentage change in
output in the first quarter as a result of the different values for these shocks, conditional
on there being no fiscal intervention and borrowing constraints always binding. We then
allow a fiscal expansion of 1% of quarterly GDP over four quarters (therefore a stimulus
of 0.25% of annual GDP per quarter), and record the average multipliers as a result of
this intervention across the nine fiscal instruments; these multipliers are presented in the
remaining columns of Table 2.
Now consider the results of targeted transfers (column (4) of Table 2). When output
is higher than in steady-state, targeted transfers have a lower multiplier compared to
when the economy is in a recession. This result follows from the intuition presented
above; when output and incomes are high, house prices are elevated and the borrowing
constraint on impatient agents does not bind, leading to lower marginal propensities to
consume for these agents and lower fiscal multipliers. The bigger the boom in the
economy, the longer the horizon over which the borrowing constraint will be slack.
When output is below that of steady state, incomes are lower, and therefore impatient
agents have a higher marginal propensity to consume, thus leading to higher multipliers
as a result of any fiscal intervention. Four-quarter cumulative multipliers for targeted
transfers range from near zero in a boom, to 0.7 in recessions. Two components influence
this variability: the underlying economy, which influences the borrowing conditions of
impatient agents; and the impact of the fiscal policy itself, further changing the horizon
over which borrowing constraints are slack.
Note that the variability in fiscal multipliers in Table 2 in the other instruments is
lower, especially when the economy is at the steady-state levels of output or below. When
this is true, the borrowing constraint on impatient households always binds, and
therefore the only change in multipliers comes from the fiscal intervention itself
influencing impatient agents’ borrowing conditions, giving some slack in their constraint.
The fiscal instruments that have a smaller impact on impatient incomes and house prices
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will therefore demonstrate lower levels of volatility in Table 2; indeed, the variability of
multipliers in Table 2 is correlated with that in Figure 3. Therefore it can be concluded
that even though fiscal multipliers are state-dependent, the policy itself has a limited
impact on its own effectiveness. The implication of this is that it is the underlying
economic climate—in our model, the credit conditions—that determines the impact of
fiscal intervention, not the direction of the fiscal action. We also consider other
specifications for fiscal shocks, and other shocks to get the borrowing constraint on
impatient households to occasionally not bind; qualitatively, the results are in line with
those above, and details can be found in Appendix A.
Monetary policy
In order to put the results on the non-linearity of fiscal policy into context, in this
subsection we extend our analysis in two dimensions: first, we consider another source of
non-linearity, that of monetary policy being at its ‘zero lower bound’ (ZLB); and second,
similar to the framework above, we consider whether the impact of monetary policy
shocks on the general economy is non-linear by varying the time over which the
borrowing constraint on impatient agents is slack. In order to consider the former, we use
a preference shock to get the nominal interest rate to be at its ZLB for up to five quarters
and then apply the small fiscal shocks from above to get multiplier values, as in the final
subsection of Section II. To investigate potential non-linearities in monetary policy, we
use a framework similar to that above, but now instead of applying a small fiscal shock
for when the impatient borrowing constraint is slack for up to 20 quarters, we apply a
small one-quarter monetary policy shock, reducing nominal interest rates. The results are
normalized to show a percentage change in output over a four-quarter horizon to a one-
quarter change in the interest rate of 100 basis points. Results from these extensions are
presented in Figure 6.
The first panel of Figure 6 demonstrates that fiscal policy multipliers are more non-
linear with changes in the ZLB length than with the borrowing conditions of impatient
households: for example, government spending (tax) multipliers are 54% (38%) larger
TABLE 2
FOUR-QUARTER CUMULATIVE AVERAGE FISCAL MULTIPLIERS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
%DGDPt G I
G TR0 Ng TR s
c sl sk ser
4 0.805 0.819 0.003 0.576 0.013 0.472 0.004 0.333 0.443
3 0.808 0.821 0.020 0.579 0.004 0.476 0.005 0.330 0.446
2 0.813 0.826 0.052 0.586 0.012 0.485 0.021 0.324 0.452
1 0.830 0.842 0.119 0.605 0.053 0.511 0.062 0.311 0.469
0 0.889 0.900 0.315 0.670 0.199 0.617 0.207 0.287 0.527
1 0.894 0.905 0.486 0.683 0.272 0.648 0.279 0.287 0.531
2 0.894 0.905 0.552 0.683 0.283 0.649 0.290 0.287 0.531
3 0.894 0.905 0.580 0.683 0.283 0.649 0.290 0.287 0.531
4 0.894 0.905 0.604 0.683 0.283 0.649 0.290 0.287 0.531
Notes
Average four-quarter multipliers where house price shocks of different sizes are used to change output by the
percentages presented in column (1). The economy is then subsequently subjected to a fiscal expansion of one
percentage point of annual GDP spread over four quarters.
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than normal times with a ZLB length of five quarters. This is intuitive given that the non-
linearity in the results presented in the final subsection of Section II derive from the
actions of impatient households (which account for half the economy in our benchmark
calibration), whereas the ZLB has an impact on the whole economy. Fiscal expansions
can have an inflationary effect that, when combined with the ZLB, lowers real interest
rates, encouraging spending by both impatient and patient households. A period where
the monetary ZLB is binding is likely to also be one where the borrowing constraint on
impatient households is also binding, as it is unlikely that the former would occur in a
consumption boom. As such, the coexistence of the ZLB and a recession would yield
even greater state dependence and hence greater asymmetries in fiscal multipliers than
those presented above. That is, the ZLB provides one end of the spectrum, where fiscal
multipliers are high and the impatient borrowing constraint is always binding; whereas
the other end of the spectrum is where the borrowing constraint on the impatient is
expected to be slack for a long time horizon. The third panel of Figure 6 confirms that
monetary policy shocks also have asymmetric impacts with smaller multipliers during
consumption booms. We also consider other specifications and calibrations for the
Taylor rule; qualitatively, the results are in line with those above, and details can be
found in Appendix A.
Further sensitivity
In addition to the above, we also performed sensitivity tests for other parameter values,
including (but not limited to): price and wage stickiness; the proportion of impatient
households in the economy; the exclusion of employers’ social security contributions,
public employment and productive public capital in the model; and higher levels of habit
persistence. Despite quantitative shifts in the sizes of multipliers, the non-linearity of
fiscal impacts remains similar to that presented above; the results are robust to further
sensitivity tests. We further present results in Appendix A from changes in other
assumptions: allowing for a fixed housing stock (as in Guerrieri and Iacoviello 2017);
including capital income tax on interest from government debt and loans; and
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FIGURE 6. Monetary policy extensions.
Notes: The first two panels present fiscal multipliers for spending and tax instruments, respectively, for
periods over which the ZLB is binding for between zero and five quarters. The third panel presents results
from a one-quarter monetary policy shock where the change in the interest rate lasts for one quarter and is
equal to 100 basis points. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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incorporating an adjustment cost to public investment similar to that of private
investment. The changes in these assumptions lead to changes in the underlying size of
multiplier but have a limited effect on the variability of the effects of fiscal multipliers.
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND DISCUSSION
Having explored the results from our theoretical model above, we now present a
discussion of these findings in the context of the broader empirical literature. In what
follows, we first provide support for the key mechanism driving our asymmetric
multipliers (calling on existing literature, estimates from the theoretical model, and
empirical multiplier estimates) before subsequently framing our findings in the context of
existing empirical findings.
Occasionally binding borrowing constraints
The asymmetries in fiscal multipliers in our model derive from variation in the marginal
propensity to consume (MPC) of impatient agents depending on the nature of their credit
constraints. Bunn et al. (2018) demonstrate that the MPC of UK households is higher in
the face of negative income shocks than that for positive ones. Importantly, Bunn et al.
(2018) demonstrate that this variation can be explained by balance sheet characteristics
concerning debt, liquidity and credit market access; it is concluded that a model with
occasionally binding borrowing constraints replicates these results. Bunn et al. (2018)
estimate that MPC values for those with mortgages (similar to the ‘impatient’ in our
model) are higher than those in owner-occupied properties (similar to the ‘patient’ in our
model), especially in the case of negative income shocks, where it is more likely for
borrowing constraints to be binding.19 Christelis et al. (2019) find similar results using
survey responses from Dutch households to demonstrate that the MPC of households is
bigger out of negative income shocks compared to positive ones. Again, Christelis et al.
(2019) demonstrate that this behaviour can be explained with a model incorporating
occasionally binding credit constraints.
Iacoviello (2005) develops a model with collateral constraints tied to housing wealth
to provide better estimates of the response of aggregate demand to house price shocks.
Iacoviello and Neri (2010) further develop this model to allow the housing stock to be
produced in its own sector, and demonstrate that spillover effects from this sector to the
macroeconomy between 1965 and 2006 are non-negligible. Guerrieri and Iacoviello
(2017) extend these models to allow collateral constraints to be occasionally binding,
introducing an asymmetry in the response of consumption to shocks, which better
explains the US economy during the great moderation and the Great Recession.
Macroeconomic skew and the simulated method of moments estimation
Models with asymmetries are better able to explain skewness in macroeconomic
observations. For example, Jensen et al. (2020) document a negative skewness in
business cycles and find that this skewness has been increasing over time in the USA.
Jensen et al. (2020) then estimate a model with occasionally binding borrowing
constraints on both households and firms to show that such a model can explain these
dynamics when combined with the observation that leverage has been increasing over
time.20 The intuition is that agents respond differently to positive shocks than to negative
shocks (as outlined above), and when leverage is higher, the response to adverse
outcomes is amplified as debt reduction becomes more burdensome. Abbritti and Fahr
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(2013) use downward nominal wage rigidity in an otherwise standard New Keynesian
model to explain positive skewness in the growth rates of wages and unemployment, and
negative skewness in output.
Panel A of Table 3 presents skewness statistics for real output, real consumption, real
investment (in both the residential and non-residential sectors, and in the consumption of
housing) and house prices for Hodrick–Prescott (HP) filtered data and quarter-on-quarter
growth rates. The one variable for which there is clear evidence of a negative skewness is
house prices; this results from many periods of low growth in prices, with short, sharp
episodes of relatively higher falls in prices. Intuitively, this could be replicated with our
model using occasionally binding borrowing constraints, as conditions are different for
when house prices are rising compared to when they are falling.
To formally test whether our model with occasionally binding constraints can better
explain these asymmetries in the data, we use the simulated method of moments (SMM)
to estimate the size and persistence of non-fiscal shocks in the model (ɛB, ɛH, ɛI, ɛA,c, ɛA,h)
by minimizing the difference between standard deviations and the skewness of the four
variables in Table 3, between the data and that resulting from the model with the
estimated shock parameters.21 That is, we estimate shock parameters that best match the
data for these moments.22 We perform this estimation twice for two versions of the
model, one where borrowing constraints are occasionally binding (as in our model
above) and one where they are always binding. By comparing the abilities of the two
models to match the data, we assess the importance of allowing for occasionally binding
borrowing constraints in the model, the mechanism that drives the results in our paper.
The results are presented in Table 3.
TABLE 3
MODEL ESTIMATION AND EMPIRICAL SKEWNESS
A. Skew in data B. Standard deviation C. Skewness
HP filter Growth Data Occas. Always Data Occas. Always
Estimation on occasionally binding constraint
Output 0.135 1.184* 1.037 1.037 1.225 1.184 0.280 0.145
Consumption 0.310 1.620* 0.903 1.187 1.557 1.620 1.008 0.276
Investment 0.569* 1.493* 4.471 3.281 3.224 1.493 0.139 0.172
House prices 0.698* 1.140* 1.986 1.986 2.062 1.140 0.252 0.089
Estimation on always binding constraint
Output 1.037 1.004 1.225 1.184 0.230 0.095
Consumption 0.903 0.937 1.176 1.620 0.700 0.276
Investment 4.471 3.006 2.996 1.493 0.209 0.215
House prices 1.986 1.159 1.185 1.140 0.330 0.170
Notes
Panel A presents skewness statistics for the four variables on data detrended using the Hodrick–Prescott filter
(column ‘HP filter’) and on quarterly growth of the variables (‘Growth’). Comparisons of results from the
estimated versions of the model with the data are presented in panels B and C, where the first column represents
statistics from the ‘Data’, the second column statistics from the model with occasionally binding borrowing
constraints (‘Occas.’), and the third column statistics from a model where these are always binding (‘Always’).
These results are split into two for the two treatments of the estimation of the model, and the corresponding
values for the size and persistence of the shock processes. The top set of results comes from models applying the
estimations of these shock parameters on the occasionally binding borrowing constraint version of the model,
and the bottom set of results comes from the estimations in the model when the constraint is always binding.
* indicates a skewness statistic that is statistically significantly different from zero with at least 99% confidence.
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When we look at the standard deviations of macroeconomic variables (panel B of
Table 3), the model with occasionally binding borrowing constraints better matches the
data, even when the algorithm is minimizing the differences for the model with always
binding constraints. The model with occasionally binding borrowing constraints also
does substantially better in matching the skewness in macroeconomic data; for all
variables in both treatments, the skewness is better estimated in the model with
occasionally binding borrowing constraints (panel C of Table 3). The model predicts less
skewness than is present in the data for all of the variables; however, our model allows
for only one source of non-linearity, and further, the estimation uses only the size and
persistence of shocks in the optimization. On average, the model with occasionally
binding borrowing constraints obtains twice as much skewness in the four
macroeconomic variables compared to the model where constraints are always binding;
this is true across a number of different iterations of the SMM exercise, where the
estimation is optimizing over different moments from the data.
Estimation of fiscal multipliers
We estimate fiscal multipliers for different underlying conditions in both the housing and
credit markets. To do this, we utilize the dataset of Romer and Romer (2010) to identify
exogenous tax changes (those that are not motivated by short-run growth) and the
smooth transitioning vector autoregression (STVAR) methodology from Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2013). This process estimates the output multiplier from exogenous tax
changes under different underlying conditions dictated by a transitioning variable. (Full
details of this process can be found in Appendix B.) In our estimates, we test for different
conditions in the housing market (determined by the changes in house prices), the credit
market (determined by changes in the liabilities to assets ratio) and (for comparison) the
business cycle (using growth in GDP per capita).23
Results from this exercise are displayed in Table 4 which presents: estimated six-
quarter multipliers during a boom (defined as when the transition variable is at its top
20th percentile, representing the highest rates of growth in house prices, credit and GDP,
respectively); six-quarter multipliers during ‘normal’ times (defined as the median of non-
boom times); and the p-value on the test of statistical significance that the estimated
coefficients of the two regimes are different. In all three cases, consistent with our
theoretical model, it is observed that multipliers are larger during normal periods than
during economic booms. For different states of the housing market and leverage,
TABLE 4
FISCAL MULTIPLIERS: EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES
LTA House prices GDP
Six-quarter multiplier: boom 1.537 0.272 0.352
Six-quarter multiplier: normal 2.107 1.307 1.685
p-value for difference 0.103 0.063 0.012
Notes
Estimations of output multipliers as a result of exogenous tax movements as identified by Romer and Romer
(2010); full details of the process can be found in Appendix B. The six-quarter cumulative multiplier during the
boom is defined as that when the transition variable is in the top 20th percentile, and normal times for the
median of the remaining values. The final row provides the p-value of statistical significance of the difference
between the estimated multiplier coefficients for boom and recession.
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multipliers are estimated to be (on average) 50% smaller during booms compared to
normal times; when GDP is booming, tax multipliers are estimated to be positive (a tax
cut leading to lower output) compared to negative estimates during normal times.
Although these results are not conclusive in themselves, they provide support for the
mechanism driving our theoretical results and further contribute to the wealth of
evidence discussed. The next subsection compares our theoretical multipliers to those
empirical estimates in the existing literature.
Existing evidence on asymmetric fiscal multipliers
There is some disagreement over the degree of asymmetry in fiscal multipliers. While
Owyang et al. (2013) and Ramey and Zubairy (2018) find limited asymmetries in
government spending multipliers with respect to slack in the economy, Baum and
Koester (2011) find more volatility in spending multipliers using a threshold VAR to
estimate a range between 0.36 in good times and 1.04 during recessions. Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2012, 2013), and Fazzari et al. (2015), on the other hand, find the
greatest range in results, with government spending multipliers statistically insignificant
from zero at the peak of the business cycle, and 1.6 or greater during recessions.24 Both
our theoretical and empirical estimates are in the middle of the range of findings in this
literature, with differences in fiscal multipliers varying by approximately 40%. It should
be noted, though, that we present one theoretical mechanism of potentially many in
which multipliers may be non-linear. Indeed, we have shown that through combining
non-linearities in the form of the ZLB on interest rates and occasionally binding
borrowing constraints, one can get a larger variation in multipliers.
Importantly, our modelling assumptions mean that higher multiplier values are
observed during ‘normal’ times when the borrowing constraint on impatient households
always binds; that is, it is not rare to have a more effective policy, and this is not limited
to times of crisis. This is indeed documented by Tagkalakis (2008) and Fazzari et al.
(2015); the latter find that the USA experienced high multipliers in most periods between
1967 and 2012, and the former presents evidence for heightened effects of fiscal policy for
19 OECD countries between 1970 and 2001 for half of this period.
There are a handful of papers that look at both government spending and tax
multipliers collectively, and the variation in estimates between the two can provide
support for our results. We find more asymmetry in government spending multipliers
compared with tax instruments, but only if transfers (targeted or otherwise) are included
in the analysis. For example, our results suggest that average government spending
multipliers are 49% lower with 20 quarters of slack in the impatient borrowing constraint,
compared with 33% lower for taxation instruments. In a model considering the liquidity
constraints on households (proxied by the loan-to-value ratios in residential lending),
Tagkalakis (2008) finds similar results utilizing data from 19 OECD countries. Spending
and taxation multipliers are 95% and 65% lower, respectively, during booms (periods of
high loan-to-value ratios) compared to recessions. Baum and Koester (2011) apply a
threshold structural VAR to data from Germany between 1976 and 2009, and find
reductions in government spending multipliers of 43.8% from recessions to expansions,
with the results for changes in tax revenue multipliers not statistically significant. Baum
et al. (2012) apply a threshold vector autoregression to data from G7 countries (excluding
Italy); however, they do not include transfers in their measure of government spending.
They find tax multipliers to be more responsive to the business cycle than government
spending multipliers (consistent with our results if we remove transfers from the analysis).
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On average across the G7 countries, spending multipliers are 40.9% lower during
expansions than recessions, whereas tax multipliers are 111.4% smaller (going from
negative multipliers in recessions to mildly positive multipliers in expansions).
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has shown that fiscal effectiveness can vary substantially across the cycle by
developing and presenting a tractable and carefully calibrated DSGE model with
endogenously binding borrowing constraints. The key to our framework has been the
state-dependent nature of the collateral constraints that are tied to the value of housing
wealth—binding in bad times while slack in good times—which, in turn, create state
dependence in fiscal multipliers. Moreover, we find that such fiscal asymmetries persist in
the long run, better matching the empirical estimates.
Another key aspect of our work has been the rich fiscal structure that we used in our
setting, enabling us to explore the state dependence of fiscal policy across a large number
of fiscal instruments. The high degree of heterogeneity on the impact of slack in the
borrowing constraint on fiscal multipliers across instruments has important interpretations
when considering potential non-linearities and subsequent policy recommendations. In
our results, transfers (and especially targeted transfers) can have a large non-linear effect
depending on the presence of slack in the impatient borrowing constraint as it is these
agents who respond to movements in transfers. On the other hand, direct government
spending and investment have lower non-linear effects as impatient consumption has less
influence on the effectiveness of these policies. The degree and source of state-dependent
multipliers are important because they offer more scope for countercyclical fiscal policy;
stimulus in a downturn can be repaid with contractionary policy during booms when
multipliers are smaller. This provides an additional dimension to policy-making, with
crucial implications for the optimal policy design.
APPENDIX A: FURTHER ROBUSTNESS TESTS
Fiscal policy
In addition to the further fiscal experiments discussed in Section III, we have also performed
experiments similar to those in Table 2 using different shocks altering the underlying conditions of
the economy; the results from above are maintained such that multipliers are higher during a
recession than in a boom, and the impact of policy itself can change the macroeconomic climate to
influence the borrowing constraints on impatient agents. We have also considered different sizes of
fiscal shocks than those presented in Table 2, and again the intuition is maintained; the larger the
fiscal shock in these experiments, the more scope this policy has on influencing the borrowing
conditions of households. We also consider two further extensions to those results in Table 2, that
of contractionary fiscal shocks, and when expansionary shocks respond with a lag of one quarter.
A negative shock can weaken a boom in the economy, and therefore lead to a shorter horizon over
which the borrowing constraint on impatient agents is not binding, thus increasing multipliers
during output expansions; the impact with which this occurs is conditional on the extent to which
the fiscal policy can influence impatient incomes and house prices. A shock that responds to the
change in output with a lag influences the economy as it returns to steady-state values when the
borrowing constraint on impatient agents is always binding; however, both of these extensions have
only small effects at the margin, and the main intuition is retained (results available on request).
We further consider experiments similar to those in the final subsection of Section II but now
including fiscal shocks: lasting for eight quarters (compared with four in the benchmark); lasting
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for four quarters (as in equations (13)) and then followed with persistence after this period (of value
0.8); and with higher levels of debt-aversion (/b;x in equations (13)). Figure A1 presents results for
both targeted transfers and labour taxes; results are not sensitive to which fiscal instruments are
considered, and these two are chosen for ease of presentation. Although fiscal multipliers in these
two extensions vary from those in the benchmark, the difference is limited. In the above two cases,
longer lasting shocks lead to higher short-run multipliers as impatient agents play an important
role in the transmission mechanism in the case of labour income taxes and transfers.25 Higher levels
of debt-aversion lead to lower multipliers as the government now more aggressively responds to
debt by lowering spending and raising taxes, thus reducing demand. Despite these changes in the
sizes of multipliers, however, the asymmetry and state dependence are maintained.
Monetary policy
We also consider alternative specifications for the Taylor rule and different calibrations of its
parameters. Figure A2 presents results for general transfers and labour tax multipliers under
various forms of Taylor rule, where again these instruments are used as examples and the results
are not sensitive to which fiscal instruments are considered. In general, the results presented in the
final subsection of Section II are robust with asymmetric responses to fiscal policy depending on the
conditions of the impatient agents’ borrowing constraint. The non-linearity of fiscal policy is
greater under two scenarios: first, when the response of the monetary authority to higher output is
muted (qy=0.01); and second, where the Taylor rule responds to output growth (GDPt/GDPt1)
instead of movements in output from the steady state. When the Taylor rule responds to output
growth, multipliers are 54% and 38% smaller for government spending and taxation instruments,
respectively, when the borrowing constraint is slack for 20 quarters compared to when it is always
binding (the corresponding differences were 49% and 33% in the benchmark results). In both
scenarios, four-quarter multipliers increase significantly (with respect to the benchmark) when the
borrowing constraint is binding, or not binding for a relatively short period of time. When this is
the case, there is a significant initial increase in output, and a monetary policy that is unresponsive




































Labour taxes output multipliers
FIGURE A1. Four-quarter cumulative multipliers: fiscal policy extensions.
Notes: Four-quarter cumulative multipliers for targeted transfers and labour taxes under a number of
different extensions, as labelled in the legend. ‘Benchmark’ represents the benchmark results from above.
‘Eight qtr shock’ represents where fiscal shocks last for eight quarters (in benchmark, fiscal shocks last for
four quarters). ‘Persistence’ represents where there is a four-quarter shock as in the benchmark, and after this
there is persistence of 0.8, such that the value of the shock decays over time. ‘Higher /b;x’ refers to /b;x ¼ 0:4
(as opposed to 0.2 in the benchmark); this change leads to debt being halved in 18 quarters on average instead
of 34 quarters in the benchmark scenario. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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to output (qy=0.01) means that the increase in the interest rate is smaller, leading to a smaller
crowding out of patient households’ consumption and as a result a greater multiplier. A similar
profile emerges when the Taylor rule responds to output growth, where changes in the interest rate
occur only in the period of growth, whereas there is no change when output is steadily above the
steady-state value. With respect to the benchmark, this also implies a smaller response of interest
rates and a lower crowding out of patient consumption. For other changes analysed in Figure A2,
there are small variations in the sizes of multipliers under different calibrations, but not in the
variability of these multipliers as a result of slack in the impatient borrowing constraint.
Model without public employment and employers’ social security contributions
As highlighted in the third subsection of Section II, it is uncommon for DSGE models to contain
both employers’ social security contributions and public employment, especially a model calibrated
to the US economy. This subsection presents results from two separate iterations of the benchmark
model above: one with public employment but without social security contributions; and another
with no public employment and no employers’ social security contributions. Figure A3 presents
results for the eight remaining fiscal instruments.
Further sensitivity checks
Figures A4–A9 present results from a set of further sensitivity checks: changing calibrations of
price and wage stickiness; changing other parameter calibrations; changing habit persistence; fixing
the stock of housing; with capital income tax on interest from loans and government debt; and
adding adjustment costs to government investment.









































Labour taxes output multipliers
FIGURE A2. Four-quarter cumulative multipliers: Taylor rule extensions.
Notes: Four-quarter cumulative multipliers for targeted transfers and labour taxes under a number of
different extensions, as labelled in the legend. ‘Benchmark’ represents the benchmark results from above.
‘Output growth’ represents where output growth, as opposed to the deviation of output from the steady state,
is in the Taylor rule (10). ‘Higher q’ represents when the calibration of this parameter is 0.85 (0.5509 in the
benchmark). ‘Lower qp’ represents when the calibration of this parameter is 1 (1.7196 in the benchmark).
‘Lower qy’ represents when the calibration of this parameter is 0.01 (0.0944 in the benchmark). [Colour figure
can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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No Ng or t er
No Ng or t er and sg = 0
FIGURE A3. Four-quarter cumulative output multipliers: models without public employment and social
security contributions.
Notes: Four-quarter cumulative output multipliers for eight fiscal instruments with models which include: the
benchmark from above; the benchmark without public employment; the benchmark without public
employment and employers’ social security contributions; and the benchmark without either employment or
employers’ social security contributions and where public capital is not productive (rg = 0). [Colour figure
can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com





































































































































FIGURE A4. Robustness checks: price and wage stickiness.
Notes: Four-quarter cumulative multipliers for eight fiscal experiments under a number of different
extensions, as labelled in the legend. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com
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FIGURE A5. Robustness checks: other parameters.
Notes: Four-quarter cumulative multipliers for eight fiscal experiments under a number of different
extensions, as labelled in the legend. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com










































FIGURE A6. Robustness checks: habit persistence.
Notes: Four-quarter cumulative multipliers in nine fiscal experiments for differing horizons over which the
borrowing constraint on impatient household does not bind. For each experiment, two sets of results are
presented: those with thinner lines are those from the benchmark; those with thicker lines are those where
agents’ utility functions feature habit persistence with parameter 0.7. [Colour figure can be viewed at wile
yonlinelibrary.com
Economica
© 2020 The Authors. Economica published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of London School of Economics and
Political Science
62 ECONOMICA [JANUARY













































FIGURE A7. Fixed housing stock.
Notes: Four-quarter cumulative multipliers in nine fiscal experiments for differing horizons over which the
borrowing constraint on impatient household does not bind. For each experiment, two sets of results are
presented: those with thinner lines are those from the benchmark above; those with thicker lines are those
where a fixed housing stock is assumed. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com












































FIGURE A8. Capital tax on interest income.
Notes: Four-quarter cumulative multipliers in nine fiscal experiments for differing horizons over which the
borrowing constraint on impatient household does not bind. For each experiment, two sets of results are
presented: those with thinner lines are those from the benchmark above; those with thicker lines are those
where a capital tax is charged on interest income from government debt and loans. [Colour figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com
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APPENDIX B: EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION: TECHNICAL
This section provides the technical details for the empirical estimation discussed in the third
subsection of Section IV. We utilize the work of Romer and Romer (2010), who develop a dataset
for classifying US tax changes into those that are endogenous to the business cycle (those that seek
to influence short-term growth) and those that are exogenous (performed for reasons beyond short-
run growth) by analysing announcements about the policies (for example, presidential speeches,
executive-branch documents and congressional reports). Utilizing this dataset and using the
smooth-transitioning model developed in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013), we estimate the
specification
Xt ¼ ah þ FðztÞ

PRðLÞXt1 þ URdt
þ 1 FðztÞPEðLÞXt1 þ UEdtþ ut;
FðztÞ ¼
eczt
1þ eczt ; c[ 0;
A1
where X is the macroeconomic outcome of interest (output in our case), Πi and Φi are lag
polynomials for periods of expansions (i = E) and recession (i = R), F(zt) is the transition function
where zt is a variable over which multipliers are allowed to vary, and dt are the exogenous tax
shocks whose size, timing and motivation are established from narrative records. We use three
different measures for our transitioning variable in three separate estimations: house price inflation
(using the all-transaction house price index from FRED); the ratio of household liabilities to assets
(from the US Flow of Funds from the Federal Reserve); and cyclical growth in GDP per capita,
identified using the Hodrick–Prescott filter (as in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2013). Following
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013), we use six-quarter moving averages of these variables, and
we use c=1.5. Following Romer and Romer (2010), we estimate equation (1) using 12 lags for the
exogenous tax shock, and then apply bootstrapping to estimate standard errors in the cumulative
output multipliers.





































































































































FIGURE A9. Adjustment costs on government investment.
Notes: Four-quarter cumulative multipliers for the eight fiscal experiments for differing horizons over which
the borrowing constraint on impatient household does not bind. For each experiment, two sets of results are
presented: the benchmark above and where an adjustment cost to government investment is imposed, similar
to that on private investment (with the same calibration). [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.c
om]
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The empirical estimates presented in Table 4 are in line with the original Romer and Romer
(2010) paper, which finds tax multipliers of 1.5 after six quarters. Note that the way in which these
multipliers are calculated differs from what we do in the theoretical analysis in the paper. Whereas
in our paper we divide the cumulative change in output by the cumulative change in the fiscal
variable over the time period against which the multiplier is measured, it is common in the
empirical literature looking at narrative changes to use the tax change in the first quarter (and not
the cumulative change in taxes over a number of quarters) as the denominator. This explains the
difference between the empirical estimates and the theoretical multiplier values in the paper.
Due to the number of observations, it is not possible to estimate fiscal multipliers under each of
the three transitioning variables simultaneously, and we estimate equation (1) for each of the
transitioning variables individually. Table A1 presents correlation coefficients across these three
variables and presents a high level of positive comovement between them in levels (panel A). That
is, high levels of output are associated with high levels of liabilities to asset and house prices;
however, when these variables are presented in growth rates (panel B), correlation diminishes, with
coefficients not significantly different from zero. Finally, when these statistics are transformed into
the smooth transitioning variables for use in specification (1), there is moderate positive
comovement (panel C), but much lower than those presented in levels.
In addition to our benchmark specifications in the third subsection of Section IV, we have
conducted sensitivity tests to ensure that the results are robust to: different values of c; different lags
of dt in the specification; and different measures for both house prices in the USA, and the loans-to-
assets ratio. In each case, the main message from the benchmark results is maintained, that fiscal
multipliers are larger during ‘normal’ times compared to boom periods in the housing market,
credit or business cycles.
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TABLE A1
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS: LIABILITIES-TO-ASSETS, HOUSE PRICES AND GDP
LTA House prices GDP
A. Levels
LTA 1.000 0.942 0.963
House prices 1.000 0.948
GDP 1.000
B. Growth rates
LTA 1.000 0.033 0.062
House prices 1.000 0.073
GDP 1.000
C. Transitioning variable
LTA 1.000 0.122 0.043
House prices 1.000 0.245
GDP 1.000
Notes
Correlation coefficients between liabilities-to-assets (LTA), house prices and GDP per capita in levels (panel A),
growth rates (panel B), and once the variables have been transformed into the transition variable (panel C) as
described in specification (A1).
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NOTES
1. Similarly, the countercyclical nature of financial intermediation and its role in the state dependence of fiscal
policy is also explored by Faria-e Castro (2017) in a paper studying the effectiveness of the US fiscal policy
during the global financial crisis. It is shown that following the global financial crisis, the fall in private
consumption would have been worse by a third in the absence of the fiscal stimulus in the USA.
2. The endogenized production of housing brings the model closer to that of Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and
Alpanda and Zubairy (2016) (among others), and provides a more realistic framework of the economy
whereby the housing stock can vary with the macroeconomic climate and can further have a feedback effect
on the economy. We test the sensitivity of our results to this assumption, which is discussed in the final
subsection of Section III.
3. The scaling factor CPc ¼ ð1 hPÞ=ð1 bhPÞ ensures, as in Iacoviello and Neri (2010), that the steady state is
not affected by habit persistence in consumption. The utility function does not allow for habit persistence in
housing; in a model similar to ours, Iacoviello and Neri (2010) estimate habit persistence in housing and find
estimates insignificant from zero.
4. Note that when we combine the net purchases of government bonds BtBt1/pt with the income from these
bonds ((Rt11)/pt)Bt1, the result would have Bt on one side of the budget constraint and Rt1Bt1/pt on
the other (with a similar condition for loans), as presented in equation (3).
5. Note that in this specification, taxes on capital income are applied to dividends and income on physical
capital, and not on income generated from holdings in government debt. This is in line with much of the
existing literature (see, for example, Leeper et al. 2010a,b; Trabandt and Uhlig 2011; Drautzburg and Uhlig
2015); we test and discuss the sensitivity of our results to this assumption in the final subsection of
Section III.
6. Note that this formulation of GDP has three components: the total demand for the non-residential good Yt;
investment in housing qHIt; and the wage cost of public sector employment ð1þ sert ÞðwPt NPg;t þ wItNIg;tÞ,
which is equal to the output of public sector.
7. We model employment by the government to be unproductive in that the output from such employment
enters neither the utility functions of agents nor the production functions of producers. The monetary value
of government employment, through the payment of wages, is added to the gross domestic product of the
economy.
8. This characterization is increasingly common in the literature; see, for example, Coenen et al. (2012).
9. Note that in the steady state, the borrowing constraint of impatient households is binding: kb ¼ 1 c=b[ 0
as c < b. We impose the restriction kbt  0, implying that impatient agents either wish to borrow (kbt [ 0) or
are indifferent between borrowing and saving (kbt ¼ 0); a similar restriction is also adopted in Guerrieri and
Iacoviello (2017).
10. Although we model the source of non-linearity as the occasionally binding collateral constraints facing the
impatient agents, it is likely that the proportion of constrained agents will also be higher in downturns,
hence increasing the likelihood of a sharp response to fiscal shocks. Our robustness checks indeed indicate
that the greater the fraction of impatient agents, the higher the fiscal multipliers in recessions and hence the
greater fiscal policy effectiveness. It is therefore straightforward to establish that fiscal asymmetry between
the booms and recessions will be greater in a model with an endogenously determined share of credit-
constrained agents. Developing such a framework would be an important avenue for future research.
11. In order to get the borrowing constraint not binding for a greater number of periods, we increase the size of
the housing preference shock. A two (eight) quarter period of slack in the borrowing constraint requires a
shock leading to an on impact increase in the house price of 0.5% (2.3%). Given that an estimated one
standard deviation housing preference shock leads to an approximate increase of 2% in the house price in
Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2017), it is clear that the magnitude of the required shock to ensure the slackness
of the borrowing constraint is well within the range observed in the data. Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2017),
for example, in an estimated version of their model, find the borrowing constraint on impatient agents to
have been slack between 1998 and 2006.
12. For government spending instruments (GC,IG,Ng,TR), we set each shock such that the change is equal to
0.01% of steady-state output. To ensure comparability of multipliers across fiscal instruments, we shock tax
rates such that the change in the steady-state tax revenue is also equal to 0.01% of steady-state output. This
size of shock ensures that the horizon over which the borrowing constraint on impatient agents is not
binding is unaffected.
13. All the data used to calculate the steady-state shares are taken from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis
(2018). Data on private consumption expenditure, non-residential investment, and residential investment
are from BEA Table 1.1.5. Data on public consumption, investment and transfers are taken from Table 3.1.
Data on public capital, private residential and non-residential capital are from Table 1.1. Data on physical
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capital in the residential production sector are taken from Table 3.1ESI. Data used to calculate the share of
employees working in the public sector are taken from Table 6.4B.
14. None of these models includes public employment, and in all three the level of transfers is fixed through the
calibration of other parameters.
15. The inclusion of either employers’ social security contributions or public employment (and, to a lesser
extent, government investment) is an uncommon assumption in the literature. Therefore we test the
sensitivity of our results to a model that does not include these; see Appendix A for further details.
16. Coenen et al. (2012) compute fiscal multipliers across seven instruments for a number of models used by
policy institutions.
17. This is in line with Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2017), who show that the borrowing constraint was slack in the
USA between 1998 and 2006, and the subsequent housing collapse led to tightening of constraints, which
exacerbated the recession of 2008–9.
18. At the margin, there is some non-monotonicity in the movements of multipliers as the borrowing constraint
on the impatient does not bind for longer horizons; that is, for some fiscal instruments, we can see a slight
increase in multipliers when the borrowing constraint is not binding for two quarters versus to when it is
always binding. This non-monotonicity is negligible (observed at the third decimal place or higher) and is
due to the fiscal experiments in equations (13) being fixed for four quarters. When the constraint on
impatient agents is not binding for two quarters (say), half of the fiscal shock is in this period, and half is
not. When this occurs, impatient agents can increase their consumption by more in periods three and four,
due to lower interest payments in period two, when the households were not borrowing as much as they
could have.
19. Further, these MPC values are higher for those who are credit-constrained, those who do not have a buffer
of savings, and those who have higher debt-to-income ratios, all reconciling with the characteristics of the
impatient in our model.
20. This is further supported in Jensen et al. (2020) through illustrating that both the state-level variance of the
Great Recession and the skewness of output are correlated with state-level debt-to-income ratios.
21. Jensen et al. (2020) discuss how SMM estimation is particularly useful for DSGE models with non-binding
borrowing constraints.
22. Following Abbritti and Fahr (2013), we use the standard deviations from Hodrick–Prescott detrended data
and the skew from growth rates (as in Jensen et al. 2020); results are not sensitive to this and are robust to
different definitions. We apply the Matlab function fminsearchbnd to perform the optimization. To
calculate moments, we used the following data: the logarithm of GDP, consumption, private investment
and residential investment, where all the data are from National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA)
Table 1.1.5 and are first divided by civilian non-institutional population over 16 (variable named
‘LNU00000000Q’ by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (2018)), and the GDP deflator (NIPA Table 1.1.4,
US Bureau of Economic Analysis (2018)); relative house prices, where house price is All-Transactions
House Price Index for the USA (variable named ‘USSTHP’ by the US Federal Housing Finance Agency
(2018)) divided by the GDP deflator; inflation is given by log difference of the GDP deflator.
23. It should be noted that the use of loans-to-value is an imperfect measure of the strength of the credit market
as higher values may represent higher availability of credit or a significant drop in the value of assets.
24. Ramey and Zubairy (2018) suggest that the results from Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013) are sensitive
to the way in which impulse response functions are derived, something that is less straightforward in non-
linear models. When using a different method to derive these impulse responses, lower levels of asymmetries
are found in Ramey and Zubairy (2018).
25. For the remaining fiscal instruments, where impatient households play a relatively less significant role in the
transmission mechanism, the negative wealth effect dominates and the more persistent action of the fiscal
authority results in smaller multipliers, and the impact on the variability of these over the business cycle is
very limited.
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